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 
Abstract—This paper proposes a self-governing 
cryptocurrency, dubbed Autonocoin. Cryptocurrency owners play 
formal tacit coordination games by making investments recorded 
on the block chain. Such investments represent bets about the focal 
point resolution of normative issues, such as whether a proposed 
change to Autonocoin should occur. The game produces a result 
that resolves the issue. With a typical cryptocurrency, the client 
software establishes conventions that ultimately lead to the 
identification of the authoritative block chain. Autonocoin 
completes a circle by making transactions on the block chain 
determine the authoritative client software. The distributed 
consensus mechanism embodied by formal tacit coordination 
games, meanwhile, can make other types of decisions, including 
which of competing block chains is authoritative and whether new 
Autonocoins should be rewarded to benefit those who have taken 
actions to benefit Autonocoin. This establishes a unique funding 
model for a cryptocurrency, and it addresses objections to 
cryptocurrencies issued predominantly to the initial founders, as 
well as to those that encourage wasteful mining activities. 
 
Index Terms—cryptocurrency, Autonocoin, Bitcoin, tacit 
coordination, focal point, Schelling point. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
RYPTOCURRENCY software establishes conventions that 
determine whether particular cryptocurrency transactions 
are valid and which collection of valid transactions (generally 
known as a “block chain”) is authoritative. Each instance of the 
client software maintains a copy of the block chain and updates 
it based on these conventions. But the client software itself does 
not establish conventions for making decisions about the future 
direction of the cryptocurrency, such as whether the 
conventions or other aspects of the software should be changed 
or whether particular individuals or firms should be rewarded 
for taking actions supporting the cryptocurrency. Those 
decisions are exogenous to the cryptocurrency, made in open-
source projects and/or private firms creating new 
cryptocurrencies. 
 This paper proposes a new cryptocurrency, which it calls 
“Autonocoin” to emphasize that the coin is autonomous.1 The 
coin would govern itself in the sense that all relevant decisions 
about the cryptocurrency would be determined by 
cryptocurrency transactions recorded in the block chain.  For 
example, a computer running the client software could 
determine whether to download and launch a proposed change 
to the client software by consulting the block chain, applying 
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an algorithm to determine whether the proposed change had 
been approved by the Autonocoin community. 
 A more important feature enabled by self-governance is the 
ability for Autonocoin to reward coins to individuals who have 
promoted the cryptocurrency (whether by coding, providing 
liquidity, adopting the currency on Internet storefronts, or by 
contributing in some other way). The awards would be 
proportional to the community’s perception of the size of the 
contribution. This avoids problems with two alternative 
systems for distributing cryptocurrency – where founders 
allocate the initial cryptocurrency (often to themselves) and 
where cryptocurrency is automatically distributed to those who 
“mine” it – and can provide better incentives for fostering 
continued contributions to a cryptocurrency’s development. 
But how does Autonocoin govern itself, and how does it 
work more generally? The short answer is that Autonocoin is 
built on the concept of a formal tacit coordination game, which 
can be used to identify a community consensus resolution of an 
issue about which there might be disagreement. This is different 
from simple vote counting (which is infeasible for a 
cryptocurrency in which individuals are unknown) or 
auctioning decisions to the highest bidder. Participants in these 
games will have economic incentives to consider not their own 
preferences, but what they think others will think (about what 
others will think, and so on in infinite regress) the best thing to 
do about a particular issue is. 
Part II of the paper explains how formal tacit coordination 
games work and how they can be applied to the tasks of 
determining rewards and determining whether a cryptocurrency 
should be improved. This part develops ideas that are explored 
in more detail in an earlier paper, Abramowicz (2015), but it 
presents them in a different light to highlight issues in the next 
part. The reader need not have read that paper, but a familiarity 
with the basic mechanics of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies 
generally is assumed in the remainder of this paper. 
Part III extends the earlier work by explaining how formal 
tacit coordination games can be used to perform the central task 
of a cryptocurrency, in particular determining which of multiple 
block chains is authoritative. The system described is called 
“proof of belief,” and the central idea is that if a controversy 
develops as to which block chain is authoritative, this can be 
resolved through a tacit coordination game. Thus, the block 
chain that cryptocurrency owners believe is authoritative will 
be recognized as such in a formal tacit coordination game.  
Part IV concludes, highlighting that Autonocoin is the first 
1 The name, broken down as “auto no coin,” also highlights that the 
cryptocurrency works in an automatic way and is virtual. 
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proposed cryptocurrency that would not merely be a peer-to-
peer cryptocurrency, but a peer-to-peer institution, one whose 
decisions are made without any central intervention. Its 
adaptability and potential for rewarding contributors makes it a 
promising candidate to become a relatively focal 
cryptocurrency in the already existing tacit coordination game 
that determines cryptocurrency value.  
II. TACIT COORDINATION 
Inherent in the proposal for Autonocoin is the recognition 
that decisions can be made without dictatorship or voting. They 
can be made based on tacit coordination. Section II.A 
summarizes the notion of tacit coordination, and Section II.B 
explains how cryptocurrencies already reflect tacit 
coordination. Section II.C explains the notion of a formal tacit 
coordination game, and Section II.D describes specific formal 
tacit coordination games that could be used to make binary 
decisions (for example, whether to approve a proposed change 
to software) or quantity decisions (for example, how large a 
reward someone should receive).  
A. Schelling Points 
The idea of tacit coordination games was developed by the 
game theorist Thomas Schelling (1980, pp. 55-56). He 
imagined the following dilemma: Two people are to meet in 
New York on a particular day, but they have not established 
exactly where or when to meet and have no means of 
communication. Where should each go? In a survey he posed, 
a majority of respondents gave the same answer: the 
information booth at Grand Central Terminal at noon. That 
location and time are in some way “focal” or salient, standing 
out from other alternatives. 
 Schelling was a game theorist and recognized that this was a 
game that could not be solved in the traditional way. There are 
multiple equilibria. One will do whatever one expects one’s 
partner to do, and if that is to meet at Broadway and 73rd St. at 
2:17 am, so be it. Perhaps there could be some situation in 
which that place and time would stand out, for example for the 
reunion of two lovers who met there and then for the first time. 
Even absent unusual circumstances, there could be 
disagreement about the appropriate focal point. Some 
individuals would undoubtedly end up disappointed on top of 
the Empire State Building. But what Schelling’s example 
establishes is that sometimes, as a result of social cognition, 
some answers are likely to appear more salient than others. 
 Two extensions to Schelling’s observation will be helpful to 
the proposal to be developed later. First, a tacit coordination 
game could occur across time. Suppose A must leave a package 
for B one day, and B must pick it up the next day. This is a hard 
problem absent further facts in New York (A would not want to 
cause a terrorist alert), but under some circumstances there 
might be a solution to it, and the problem in any event is a 
problem in tacit coordination. 
 Second, a tacit coordination game can be normative. That is, 
two or more people may wish to coordinate in a way that 
depends on their shared normative conception of a particular 
issue. Take the dilemma of a member of Congress listening to 
the President’s State of the Union address. Each member may 
wish to clap when others in the member’s party do so, yet not 
wish to observe others before starting. This requires an analysis 
of the normative content of a statement by the President and an 
assessment of whether the party approves or disapproves of that 
statement, as well as whether it is an important enough 
statement and an appropriate enough time for applause. 
 
B. Tacit Coordination for Cryptocurrencies 
Existing cryptocurrencies already depend inherently on tacit 
coordination. As Kroll et al. (2013, p. 2) note, those who 
transact with or mine cryptocurrency “must maintain consensus 
(1) on the rules to determine validity of transactions, (2) on 
which transactions have occurred in the system, and (3) that the 
currency has value.”  
To be sure, (1) is more akin to finding someone in New York 
after one has already agreed to meet someplace than it is to 
coordinating without communication. After all, the rules are 
already embodied in the client software. Nonetheless, this 
highlights that human activity often reflects tacit coordination 
based on social facts perceptions of which are widely shared. 
Someone could propose that Bitcoin suddenly switch to a 
different set of rules, or even create software that would do so. 
The switch will occur only if there is some process by which 
the community concludes not only that this would be beneficial, 
but also that others (anticipating what others will think, again 
in infinite regress) will think the benefits sufficient to justify the 
change at some particular moment.  
Tacit coordination of this sort is extremely difficult. Imagine 
a very large group of New Yorkers who meet every day at 
Grand Central. Perhaps many individually think that the Empire 
State Building roof would be a better meeting place, but no one 
is likely to make the change absent some reason to think others 
not only agree, but agree at the same time. This usually requires 
some form of centralized coordination, such as a vote or at least 
a group discussion including explicit commitments by some 
people that they will leave. This type of coordination is 
especially difficult if there are people with strong opinions on 
both sides and if the costs of a coordination failure are high. In 
those circumstances, the status quo will provide a very strong 
focal point. 
The reason that Bitcoin is able to evolve is that the status quo 
is one in which the Bitcoin community (particularly the miners) 
accept whatever changes are implemented by those who control 
the official repository of the software code. Moreover, those 
individuals have explicitly committed to conservative 
development principles, to not making changes where there is 
substantial disagreement about their value. The combination of 
these factors allows the community to maintain consensus on 
the rules for determining transaction validity and the software 
code generally. But it also means that there is a strong status 
quo bias. 
This highlights an important point: Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies provide peer-to-peer means of validating 
currency transactions but decisions about how those 
cryptocurrencies should evolve are not peer-to-peer. There may 
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be a temptation to lump open-source software development 
(used for Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies) and peer-
to-peer mechanisms. The observation is that even if there are 
only some individuals authorized to make a change to an open-
source repository, the ability of anyone to fork the code and 
make a new repository constrains the open source developers. 
(See Nyman & Lindman 2013). Thus in neither case, the 
argument might go, do authoritative decision makers exist.  
The difference, though, is that peer-to-peer mechanisms (like 
the Bitcoin protocol or various file-sharing protocols) operate 
pursuant to clearly identified rules, encapsulated in algorithms 
and computer programs. It is easy to tacitly coordinate once 
there is agreement on such rules. The question of which open 
source software repository should be seen as authoritative (and 
thus of whether those protocol rules should be) is far less clearly 
defined. The result of this is that majority or even supermajority 
views about how protocols should change are not likely to 
control. Informal tacit coordination will have a strong status 
quo bias (which may or may not involve strong deference to a 
central decisionmaker) because of the absence of a mechanism 
for peers to resolve disputes among themselves. Traditional 
mechanisms for resolving disputes, such as voting and use of 
representatives, are centralized (and thus not peer-to-peer), but 
the absence of one of these mechanisms does not mean that 
decisionmaking is peer-to-peer in any meaningful way. 
The difference can be highlighted by focusing on (2), the 
coordination about which transactions are authoritative. This is 
accomplished peer-to-peer in Bitcoin and most other 
cryptocurrencies. There are clear rules for determining which 
transactions are valid, and so the tacit coordination is around 
these rules rather than around particular transactions. This 
highlights the challenge of this paper. The goal is to build a 
cryptocurrency in which tacit coordination is used to make 
decisions about which of competing block chains is valid. But 
to make this possible, we will first need to develop tacit 
coordination around rules for formalizing tacit coordination 
more generally, so that subjective and potentially controversial 
questions can be resolved.  
Perhaps the most interesting tacit coordination is (3), 
coordination around the notion that a particular cryptocurrency 
is valuable. To some extent this is no different from other 
securities, whose value derives largely from the expectation of 
value in the future. But companies produce goods and services, 
and their securities’ values are derivative of this. The tacit 
coordination is accentuated with cryptocurrencies, because a 
cryptocurrency has value only because others will value it in the 
future. Of course, this is true of other currencies as well, but 
with fiat currencies, the perception of central government 
power makes tacit coordination easy. Sure, U.S. citizens can 
transact in any currency but the fact that dollars are legal tender 
and thus must be accepted as a means of payment makes the 
focal point obvious, at least where the government’s power is 
unchallenged. 
What makes (3) particularly difficult is that there are many 
cryptocurrencies (over 500). Thus, even if there is a consensus 
that cryptocurrencies as a group have value (because 
transacting in them is cheaper, or more private, or more 
independent of governmental authority), that does not resolve 
the question of which cryptocurrency has value. This is a task 
entirely for tacit coordination. Each person will assess the 
relative value of a cryptocurrency based on how he or she 
expects others to expect others to value it. But what makes one 
cryptocurrency more salient than another? 
The salience of a cryptocurrency can in part be normative. 
For some users of cryptocurrency, the appeal of a 
cryptocurrency is inherently ideological, generally stemming 
from libertarian premises. The relative appeal of individual 
cryptocurrencies may then depend on their ideological appeal 
within the cryptocurrency community, as well as their 
anticipated normative appeal within the broader group of 
consumers who represent potential users of cryptocurrencies. 
There is a perception among some that cryptocurrencies 
dependent on mining are more fair than those in which 
cryptocurrency is distributed to founders. (See, e.g., 
https://twitter.com/dwr/status/496578410856984576) Later, 
we will argue that Autonocoin may be perceived as fairer than 
non-mining cryptocurrencies. This perception boosts Bitcoin 
and other mined currencies over others. 
On the other hand, the claim that Bitcoin mining is wasteful 
may decrease the normative appeal of Bitcoin. And if Bitcoin 
mining is in fact wasteful, that will of course also decrease 
Bitcoin’s strength in the tacit coordination game competition 
among different cryptocurrencies. Mining is costly, because it 
deflates the value of the currency, and subsidizing mining 
through transaction costs above marginal cost faces the same 
problem. The costs of Bitcoin mining may be too great if mining 
provides a level of security against manipulation that is either 
excessive or that could be obtained more cheaply with some 
other mechanism. The case for Autonocoin will similarly 
depend in part on whether its mechanism for identifying the 
authoritative block chain provides sufficient security. Of 
course, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies may have other 
flaws, real and perceived, and their relative status will depend 
in part on participants in the informal tacit coordination game’s 
recognition of these flaws.  
Absence of flaws in a cryptocurrency’s design, however, is 
not sufficient. An obvious aspect of salience is whether a 
cryptocurrency is in common use, and another is whether the 
cryptocurrency was innovative. This explains much of 
Bitcoin’s high market capitalization relative to other 
cryptocurrencies. After all, anyone else could take the Bitcoin 
reference software and make some new coin (MeTooCoin) just 
like Bitcoin but with a different block chain root. Whether or 
not the person mines a lot of MeTooCoins before releasing 
information about MeTooCoin to the public, MeTooCoin is not 
likely to be successful. It has low salience relative to Bitcoin. If 
MeTooCoin could easily take away market share from Bitcoin, 
then there would be many coins indistinguishable in market 
share.  
A cryptocurrency that innovates, introducing features absent 
in Bitcoin, can become salient, and thus tacitly coordinating 
individuals can agree that the cryptocurrency has value. This 
tacit coordination may reflect a judgment that in the long term, 
many cryptocurrencies can coexist, with relative values 
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determined by tacit coordination. Or it may reflect a judgment 
that the upstart has some chance of becoming the top 
cryptocurrency of the future. If there is a perception that Bitcoin 
has some limitation – say, that mining is inherently inefficient, 
or that it lacks some feature that some other cryptocurrency has 
– then there might be a gradual move from Bitcoin to some 
other cryptocurrency. That could lead to a tipping point in 
which its value increases abruptly and Bitcoin’s decreases and 
it becomes far more valuable than Bitcoin. The dynamic could 
be similar to a familiar one in the corporate world, where an 
upstart like Facebook can dominate an earlier entrant like 
MySpace because of a gradually increasing perception that the 
upstart’s technology is superior. 
It might seem that the Bitcoin developers should respond by 
mimicking the features of other cryptocurrencies. The follower 
in a yachting race will often angle sails in a way that is likely to 
increase the lead but may give the follower a chance if the wind 
changes direction; the leader then may mimic the follower’s 
move to ensure that it stays ahead of the follower. With many 
followers, however, this strategy is less sensible. Moving in the 
wrong direction to prevent one follower from overtaking it 
would enable some other follower to catch up.  
Nonetheless, it might seem at least that Bitcoin should 
incorporate all features widely regarded as beneficial. This 
could even involve radical change, such as from a proof-of-
work to a proof-of-stake currency. But the bias toward the status 
quo would prevent that, even if most felt that the latter was 
superior. To ensure tacit coordination around Bitcoin and 
within Bitcoin (that is, avoiding hard forks of the currency), the 
developers are wisely hesitant to add new features without very 
strong levels of agreement. Even though the tacit coordination 
status quo is to allow the developers on the central repository to 
make decisions, making controversial ones could endanger that, 
so the developers themselves respect the status quo on 
controversial matters. The downside of this is that this 
conservativeness potentially helps competitors, and though any 
new cryptocurrency starts with the disadvantage of not being in 
common use, one may someday find itself in the dominant 
position that Bitcoin enjoys today. 
That competitor, of course, would then have similar 
incentives to be conservative and might be vulnerable to 
competitors in turn. The strongest competitor to Bitcoin today 
is XRP, in part because it is part of a network called Ripple that 
facilitates currency exchange. But if it surpasses Bitcoin, then 
it may face competition from some other rival with some other 
feature that represents a significant technical departure. The 
developers of Ripple will likewise hesitate to add that feature if 
there is significant controversy about it, because of the risk of a 
hard fork should a large number of those operating client 
software refuse to integrate it.  
This suggests that perhaps the most desirable feature for a 
cryptocurrency would be adaptability. This is an ability to 
introduce changes generally thought beneficial even where they 
are somewhat controversial, without causing a schism within 
the community surrounding that cryptocurrency. As long as the 
authoritative version of particular cryptocurrency depends on 
informal tacit coordination, that will be hard to achieve. There 
is always the danger of a hard fork, and that reduces innovation, 
especially for a leader. For a cryptocurrency to be adaptable, 
there would need to be very strong informal tacit coordination 
on some formal means of determining whether changes are 
legitimate, in much the same way as a stable mature republican 
government is very stable even in the face of controversy about 
the wisdom of particular laws. The core principle of 
Autonocoin (and thus one that could attract strong informal tacit 
coordination) is that decisions are based on a particular formal 
means of tacit coordination.  
C. Formal Tacit Coordination  
By a “formal game,” I mean simply a game in which each 
player must make one or more discrete decisions and receives a 
payoff based entirely on the decisions made by the players as a 
whole. In a formal tacit coordination game, each player’s 
incentive is to make a decision that will be the same as the one 
that the player expects other players to make. Formal game 
theory cannot predict the equilibrium of a tacit coordination 
game, but we can predict what a player will do on the 
assumption that there is some focal point that all players can 
estimate. 
Consider the following simple example of a formal game: 
Suppose an observer of a beauty contest is told to rate the beauty 
of a competitor on a scale of 1 to 10. The observer of the contest 
is further told that there is some probability (say, 50%) that 
another observer will afterward be asked the same question. 
The first observer is promised payment according to a schedule 
that ensures that the amount will always be greater, the closer 
the observer is to the observation of the second observer. If by 
chance there is no second observer, then the first observer will 
receive nothing. If there is a second observer, however, that 
observer will face exactly the same incentives, asked to 
anticipate the answer of a hypothetical third observer, who 
would be asked to anticipate a fourth, and so on. 
This example is reminiscent of a famous one by Keynes 
(1936), who described a game with “the prize being awarded to 
the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the 
average preferences of the competitors as a whole.” Keynes 
notes that such a game requires each player to anticipate “what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be.” But Keynes 
described such a game because he was skeptical that the game 
would reach the correct result, and indeed his broader point was 
to criticize the rationality of stock markets. Though Schelling 
had not yet written about focal points, Keynes recognized the 
possibility that someone might give a different answer when 
asked what the average participant would think than when 
asked simply for an opinion. 
Keynes’s implicit critique is that irrelevant factors might 
enter into the evaluations by participants in such a game. This 
might be especially true in Keynes’s game, where the winner-
take-all nature of the prize might complicate decisionmaking; 
one might search for a number that would be an average but that 
people wouldn’t recognize as such. But even with our version 
of the game, it is possible that there might be some additional 
focal points that could affect decisionmaking – the middle of 
the spectrum (5.5), a round number (5), a lucky number (7), the 
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height of the candidate in feet, the order of the candidate in a 
group, the score of the previous contestant, and so on. Usually, 
though, these will tend to cancel out, and the best strategy will 
be to consider what one thinks the general view actually would 
be.  
The question is ultimately empirical, but it seems highly 
unlikely that a participant in the simple 1-to-10 beauty game 
above would give a middling score to a contestant who, by 
conventional standards, appeared to be one of the most 
strikingly beautiful women in the world. At least this is so if the 
financial incentive is sufficiently great to matter more than 
considerations such as making a social statement. As long as it 
seems more likely that the next participant will focus on beauty 
than on any other approach, it will make sense for the first 
participant to do so as well. 
 Formal tacit coordination games are especially likely to elicit 
opinions about normative questions when there is some 
collective benefit from following this approach, as opposed to 
seeking some other focal point. As Hosni (2009, p. 37) points 
out, players in coordination games will often coordinate around 
the solution that produces the highest total payoffs to the 
players. It is in any one player’s interest simply to anticipate the 
actions of the other players, but if there is a particular approach 
that is best for all the players (including hypothetical players), 
that approach then becomes a powerful focal point.  
Autonocoin is built on formal tacit coordination games. If for 
early decisions made by Autonocoin, players were to latch onto 
some other focal point (such as the midpoint of the permissible 
range of values), then Autonocoin would fail. The players 
would thus lose their opportunity for earning further profits by 
continuing to make decisions for Autonocoin. That makes it all 
the more likely that each player will anticipate that the next 
player will make moves consistent with the normative questions 
posed. Meanwhile, once a norm of doing so is established, it 
will become entrenched. That is, once there has occurred 
repeated informal tacit coordination that the “right” way to play 
the formal tacit coordination game is to resolve the relevant 
normative questions, that affects what any participant thinks the 
next participant will do in any such game. Absent some 
compelling reason to expect sudden deviation from the 
established strategy in such games, players are likely to 
continue playing as before. 
 As long as Autonocoin’s formal games are structured to 
produce tacit coordination, there is thus a strong chance that the 
results of Autonocoin’s self-governance will be consistent with 
community views about how particular questions should be 
resolved. Not any formal tacit coordination game will work, 
however. The simple beauty pageant game above would require 
some mechanism for choosing random participants. While it is 
possible to imagine such an approach (for example, by 
generating pseudo-random numbers from the block chain), the 
particular holders of Autonocoin chosen might not want to 
participate. An alternative is to develop a formal game in which 
anyone can participate by making an investment of Autonocoin, 
and the result of the game can be conclusively determined by 
assessing the sequence of investments in the block chain. 
1) Binary Decisions 
Consider first binary decisions. A particularly important 
binary decision would be to approve or disapprove a proposed 
set of changes to the reference software code. Anyone could 
initiate a proposal to adopt a particular change to the code by 
creating a transaction with metadata referring to a hash of the 
proposed changes to the reference code, as well as perhaps other 
information, such as the address of the git repository with the 
proposed changes. (If the proposed changes did not exist or 
were not publicly accessibly, then other decisionmakers could 
reject the proposal in the formal tacit coordination game.) 
Others could then either support or oppose the proposal. The 
initial proposal would require a fixed fee, while others could 
allocate any number of Autonocoins in favor or against the 
proposal. All spending decisions would be made by sending 
Autonocoins to addresses based on the hash of the metadata (for 
example, addresses that can be generated by a hash of the 
original metadata hash plus “Yes” or “No”).  
The game would end after two conditions are met: first, at 
least a specified amount of time has passed (or number of 
blocks have been added to the block chain), perhaps a week; 
and second, there has been no change in what the final 
resolution would be over some shorter amount of time, perhaps 
an hour. The winning position would be the position attracting 
more total investment, counting the proposal fee as being in 
favor. Any money then spent on the losing position would then 
be distributed to supporters of the winning position, up to the 
amount spent in order of investment. Any money spent on the 
winning position is refunded. So, if A initiates a proposal by 
spending 5, B opposes by spending 6, and C supports by 
spending 5, then the proposal is passed, and A receives 10 (a 
refund of its own 5 plus 5 from B), and C receives 6 (a refund 
of its own 5 plus the last 1 from B). 
This produces the coordination dynamics of a formal tacit 
coordination game. If the current position favors position X, 
then one will have an incentive to add enough support for Y to 
put Y in the lead if one thinks that either no one else will 
participate or else that any subsequent participants will in total 
be more likely to favor Y than X. Continuing the example above, 
after C moves, there are 10 Autonocoins in favor of the proposal 
and 6 in opposition. D (who could be the same as B) will have 
an incentive to add at least a little more than 4 Autonocoins if 
D expects that E, F, etc. will in total be more likely to be 
opposed than in favor. 
D might be especially likely to do this if D develops an 
argument or some analysis supporting this position and shares 
that with other participants (for example, by posting on the 
Internet using the hash so that the argument can be found by 
others). Participants do not merely have incentives passively to 
identify the focal point, but also to try to persuade one another 
about what the focal point is. Formal tacit coordination games 
are thus a deliberative process, providing incentives to produce 
arguments and analysis that may change others’ views about 
where the focal point is. 
D might add more than 4 Autonocoins as a signal that it is 
willing to support its position aggressively, but others might do 
the same in the opposite direction, and if the investments 
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become large, that will provide incentives for more participants 
to enter into the competition. This is why it is important for 
participants to consider not only who is likely to play the game, 
but also who might play the game in the next round if it turns 
out that there is a large amount of disagreement, keeping in 
mind that those playing then would be thinking ahead to the 
possibility of even higher stakes drawing in even more 
participants. 
Binary decisions are, of course, simple, but they can be 
aggregated to make more complicated decisions. Indeed, the 
possibility of using binary decisions to approve changes to the 
reference software code establishes that series of binary 
decisions can also be used to make decisions about evolution of 
a text. This text might also be a set of rules or norms concerning 
formal tacit coordination games should be resolved. For 
example, Autonocoin could be used to approve rules governing 
what type of support must be provided before a proposed 
change to the code can be considered. This might, or might not, 
include provision of unit and integration tests to establish that 
the change will work successfully, expert opinions, explanation 
of why the change should be made now rather than later, etc. 
The point is that Autonocoin can be used both to make decisions 
about whether to change the reference software code and to 
develop principles about how those decisions should be made. 
The relatively simple decisionmaking mechanism described 
here thus could become more elaborate over time, with code 
support for more complex scenarios and evolution of textual 
guidance. 
2) Quantity Decisions 
Autonocoin could also be used to make quantity decisions. 
This is particularly important for Autonocoin to be able to serve 
its role of providing rewards for those who engage in activities 
beneficial to Autonocoin. Someone could propose a reward for 
his or her own account by paying the proposal fee, and others 
would then determine whether a reward should be given at all 
(a binary decision), and if so, how high the reward should be. 
One important use of a reward might be to provide 
compensation for those who have initiated proposals that ended 
up receiving support. This answers a potential objection to the 
binary decision approach, that the first participant has little 
incentive to pay the proposal fee. (Subsequent participants have 
incentives to participate if they believe that the amounts paid so 
far are supporting the wrong answer.) 
One way of making quantity decisions would be to simply 
combine binary decisions, allowing each to serve in effect as a 
bit in a number. But this may be unnecessarily complex. An 
alternative is to allow each participant (including the initial 
proposer) to specify the value that they believe is appropriate in 
metadata for the investment. That is, one might pay 10 
Autonocoin in favor of the position that someone should receive 
3 Autonocoin as a reward for some support of Autonocoin.  
Each new participant’s investment establishes a bet with the 
prior investor that the new participant’s proposed value will be 
closer to the final proposed value than the previous 
participant’s. The new participant must bet as much as the 
immediately prior participant, plus some additional amount that 
a subsequent participant can challenge in a bet. So, suppose A 
initiates by placing 1 Autonocoin on the number 50, and B 
responds by placing 2 Autonocoin on the number 75, and C in 
turn places 4 Autonocoin on 25. If there is no further activity, 
then A wins its 1 Autonocoin bet with B (and also receives back 
its own 1 Autonocoin investment), and C wins its 1 Autonocoin 
bet with B and also receives back the 4 Autonocoin that it 
invested. Note that C’s bet with B is for only 1 Autonocoin, 
because the first 1 Autonocoin that B invests is for its bet with 
A.  
III. PROOF OF BELIEF 
The preceding sections have shown that it is possible to 
design a cryptocurrency to provide the capability of playing 
formal tacit coordination games, thus allowing the software 
managing the cryptocurrency’s block chain to make decisions 
(including a decision to update the software in a particular way) 
based on a community consensus. Such capabilities could be 
integrated into cryptocurrencies based on various distributed 
consensus mechanisms, including proof of work (like Bitcoin) 
or proof of stake (like NXT). But formal tacit coordination 
games are an alternative means of determining distributed 
consensus. This thus raises the question whether formal tacit 
coordination games can be used to furnish the distributed 
consensus mechanism underlying a cryptocurrency. This 
section argues that they can do so and explains how Autonocoin 
could be used to identify what block chain is valid. 
A. The Proof-of-Belief Distributed Consensus Mechanism  
Existing distributed consensus mechanisms for 
cryptocurrencies must accomplish three distinct but related 
tasks: First, a mechanism must provide for determining the 
validity of a transaction. This is accomplished by using digital 
signatures and thus does not vary across cryptocurrencies in 
ways relevant here. Second, a mechanism must provide a 
convention for determining whether the record of all 
transactions (the block chain) is in fact the authoritative one. 
The central problem that a cryptocurrency must address is the 
danger of double-spends, and so this mechanism must ensure 
that this record is sufficiently comprehensive. Third, a 
mechanism must provide a convention for determining whether 
a proposed additional block of transactions should be added to 
the block chain. 
The proof-of-work approach accomplishes the last of these 
tasks by awarding new currency to the first to solve a puzzle. 
The puzzle is to generate a new block, consisting of valid new 
transactions, an arbitrary nonce, and a link to the previous 
block, in a way that produces a sufficiently low hash score. A 
miner must try an enormous number of nonce values and 
transaction permutations to solve the puzzle correctly. This 
leads directly to the mechanism for determining which of two 
alleged block chains is authoritative: The authoritative block 
chain is the one that required more work (generally, but not 
necessarily, the longest block chain).  
Proof-of-stake approaches vary in their precise 
implementation, but the general idea is similar. A valid block in 
some versions is a block generated by a user whose “turn” it is 
to mine new currency; thus, each user has an incentive to 
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participate in the mining process, but need not solve difficult 
problems. In other versions, a valid block is a block consisting 
of transactions with sufficient “coin age,” which is proportional 
time since they were last spent. In such a system, the valid block 
chain is the one that uses the greatest coin age. 
For Autonocoin, let us take the challenges in the reverse 
order, addressing first the question of how to determine which 
block chain is authoritative among multiple competing block 
chains. This can be determined by allowing decisions on the 
block chain as to whether any particular block is a valid block 
that should be on the block chain. This is simply a binary 
version of the formal tacit coordination game, and any player 
can initiate a decisionmaking process to approve of a particular 
block as authoritative. If otherwise there would be insufficient 
incentives to initiate this decisionmaking process, rewards 
could be proposed for those who successfully initiated 
designations of blocks as valid.  
That allows a measure of proof of belief in a particular block 
and in a particular block chain. The phrase follows from the 
recognition that any payment made in a formal tacit 
coordination game represents a bonded signal that the 
participant making it believes that others will agree with the 
participant’s recommended decision. The measure of proof of 
belief in a particular block is the difference between payments 
made in support of a block’s authenticity and payments made 
in opposition to a block’s authenticity. The measure of proof of 
belief in a valid block chain (that is, one in which the hash for 
each block refers to the previous block) is the sum of the proofs 
of belief for each block. Note that a block currently viewed as 
invalid could still be part of the authoritative block chain; such 
a situation could endure in the long term as an indication that 
validation of a particular block was a mistake but that the 
mistake is too far in the past to correct. 
1) The Authoritative Block Chain 
The convention that Autonocoin establishes is that the 
authoritative block chain is the one with the highest proof-of-
belief score. Critically, a user who endorses a block (or who 
does the reverse) places the currency invested in the formal tacit 
coordination game at risk. Regardless of the final determination 
of whether this existing block is authoritative, the transaction 
will be broadcast and thus may count as a spend on some later 
block of the authoritative block chain. (We will explain in the 
next section what provides incentives for individual blocks to 
include all applicable transactions.)  
In determining which of two competing block chains is 
authoritative, three clarifications are necessary. First, a client 
should take into account all cryptographically signed 
transactions on both block chains. This ensures that one cannot 
create a block chain that has an artificially high proof-of-belief 
score simply by omitting transactions challenging the 
legitimacy of one or more blocks. If, for example, a block chain 
were presented with a 1 million Autonocoin verified transaction 
on one block chain attesting to the validity of the block chain, 
but the competing block chain also included a 1 million 
Autonocoin transaction opposing validity, the net effect would 
be zero proof of belief. 
Second, a client should exclude from its analysis of the proof-
of-belief of one block chain any transactions that are invalid 
according to the other block chain, as well as any transactions 
that are descendants of this transaction. Thus, if someone has 
spent the same Autonocoin in different transactions on two 
block chains, both of these spends will be disregarded in 
measuring proof-of-belief. This prevents someone from 
obtaining power by remembering private keys for already spent 
Autonocoins and then using these private keys to respend the 
money to bolster some other block chain in which the spending 
had not yet taken place.  
Third, if a purported block chain indicates that someone has 
received currency as a result of a conclusion of a formal tacit 
coordination game, either in the form of winnings or in the form 
of a reward, but the other block chain has not resolved that game 
or not resolved it in the same way, then it will be disregarded. 
This prevents an attacker from making up a block chain in 
which the person has been awarded many Autonocoin and then 
uses some of those Autonocoin to bolster the block chain’s 
proof of work.  
With this set of rules defining the identification convention, 
the authoritative block chain could change, if someone were to 
sign a transaction manifesting sufficient belief in one or more 
blocks in a proposed new block chain or a transaction 
expressing sufficient doubt about one or more of the blocks in 
the block chain. The longer the block chain, however, the more 
expensive it would be to change the authoritative block chain 
significantly even for a short time. One might delete a single 
block by initiating a formal tacit coordination game to 
recognize some alternative last block (linking to the 
penultimate block) as authoritative. But this would require an 
investment greater than the proof of belief of the existing last 
block. Moreover, there would be little reason to do this if the 
existing block would be viewed as the valid one by the 
community. Someone would have an immediate incentive to 
win the investment of money in the alternative block by 
opposing it.  
Making more radical changes to the block chain would be 
even more difficult. To dislodge a block 10 blocks from the end 
of the block chain, one would need to dislodge all of the last 10 
blocks, since the question is not just whether the block is valid 
but whether the block chain as a whole is valid. This would 
require the challenger to establish a proof-of-belief score 
against that block at least as great as the net proof-of-belief of 
the last 10 blocks combined. Thus, older blocks are more secure 
in the block chain than newer blocks. In this sense, Autonocoin 
is like Bitcoin. A particular block in the Bitcoin block chain 
may eventually be removed from it, for example because 
another proposed block is added for the same spot in the block 
chain at around the same time. (In this case, the authoritative 
block chain becomes the one onto which the next valid block 
will be added.) But it is unlikely that many blocks will be 
removed. 
Is Autonocoin susceptible to more serious attacks that could 
destabilize the block chain for long periods? The danger of 
attack is similar to the danger for Bitcoin. With Bitcoin, 
someone who obtains more mining power than everyone else 
combined can out-mine everyone else. That person can then 
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ignore even valid blocks produced by others. The attacker can 
then determine what transactions to put on the block chain and 
what to leave off and can even remove some blocks from the 
block chain, replacing them over time with more blocks than 
everyone else can add to the valid block chain and eventually 
becoming recognized by the authoritative software. This is the 
essence of a so-called 51% attack. 
Similarly, in Autonocoin, someone who has a credible threat 
to be able to put up 51% of Autonocoins in formal tacit 
coordination games to achieve desired results will be able to 
control the currency. But it is not enough to have more 
Autonocoins than others who are actually participating in the 
formal tacit coordination games; the question is always what 
the resolution would be if a particular game became sufficiently 
controversial. So, one might need to own 51% of Autonocoins, 
or at least 51% of the Autonocoins owned by those who might 
participate in a formal tacit coordination game if the stakes 
became sufficiently large. This would be quite a bit to 
accumulate, especially since the consequence of success would 
be to destroy Autonocoin and any value accumulated. The most 
likely scenario, as with a Bitcoin 51% attack, might involve a 
“Goldfinger” attack by a government whose goal is to destroy 
the cryptocurrency rather than to profit fromit. 
It is difficult to determine whether a 51% attack would be 
easier to mount against Bitcoin or Autonocoin, though it would 
likely be impossible with either. A potential weakness of 
Bitcoin, however, is the possibility of collusion by miners. 
There are already mining pools, and one pool recently came 
close to 50% market share. Moreover, at any time, multiple 
pools could theoretically decide to work together. There is little 
danger that they would do so to destroy the block chain or to 
execute a double-spend. But they might do so to change the 
Bitcoin protocol, either by increasing the schedule at which 
Bitcoins are issued or increasing mining fees. After all, miners 
have large irreversible investments in computers dedicated to 
mining and thus have an incentive to avoid bankruptcy. In the 
long run, Bitcoin may be determined by the interests of miners, 
while Autonocoin will evolve based on the perceived interests 
of a broader community. 
At least one other type of attack, however, must be 
considered. An attacker might spend many already spent 
Autonocoins in the block chain, place the transactions 
performing this spending on another block chain and present 
this as the valid one. According to the rules above, these 
transactions would not count, but any descendants of the 
original transactions also would be discounted. The goal would 
be to ensure that the Autonocoins previously believed valid 
could not be spent in support of the true valid block chain, 
possibly allowing an attack with less than 51% of total power. 
Especially once ownership becomes widely dispersed, 
however, there will still be many Autonocoins that could be 
used to counter the attack, and the owners of such coins will 
have sufficient incentives to counter. 
Addition of even occasional checkpointing could virtually 
eliminate momentary destabilization from such an attack, 
because coins spent before a checkpoint could not be respent on 
a fake block chain. A checkpoint could be added using binary 
formal tacit coordination games. An Autonocoin owner could 
initiate such a game to identify a particular block (through its 
hash) as a block that should be in every blockchain. After some 
period of time, the software would enforce a checkpoint 
authoritatively chosen, thus always preferring a block with 
known checkpoints to one without them. Checkpointing is not 
essential to the proof-of-belief system of distributed consensus, 
but it could be useful as a mechanism for stabilizing the 
blockchain. It could also help fight denial-of-service attacks, as 
is the case with Bitcoin.  
2) An Authoritative Block 
The inclusion of a mechanism to define the authoritative 
block chain is sufficient but perhaps question-begging. The 
formal tacit coordination games described here are designed to 
answer normative questions. It may sometimes be clear that an 
attempt to change the block chain would be normatively 
undesirable – for example, if valid transactions were being 
eliminated – but there might also be multiple proposed new 
blocks that seem equally normatively justifiable. They might 
differ in relatively minor ways, such as the order of the 
transactions in the block, or whether a transaction offered just 
as a block was being created should be included. 
Autonocoin could sort out these questions over time, but it 
may be desirable to have some convention established at least 
initially. This convention could be in writing, even if not part of 
the software code that assembles and validates the block chain. 
For example, one convention might be as follows: A block 
should be added to the block chain every five seconds. A valid 
block could be defined as incorporating every transaction 
broadcast by a reputable third party, using a digital signature 
with a timestamp, ordered by timestamp (and, in the event of a 
tie, by hash). So, transactions timestamped between 12:00:00 
and 12:00:05 would be placed in the same block. A convention 
could also provide that such a block would not be submitted for 
approval until 12:00:10, to give sufficient time to ensure that all 
valid transactions would be included.  
This convention would still leave room for some normative 
questions. Most obviously, participants in the proof-of-belief 
formal tacit coordination games might need to assess whether a 
timestamper is reputable. Usually, this is not a hard question. A 
timestamper who issued old timestamps or delayed 
broadcasting transactions would be quickly spotted, and so the 
formal tacit coordination game would likely lead to elimination 
of such timestampers. As in all normative matters, there might 
be close cases, but once such a question were resolved for one 
block, that resolution would be given some weight in 
determining the resolution for the next block. 
Another difficult case that might arise would be a 
timestamped transaction that somehow was not broadcast 
properly because of a protocol error. But again, this could likely 
be sorted out either in writing or by convention. For example, a 
convention might be that if a transaction from 12:00:03 did not 
become known until after 12:00:10, it would be deemed invalid. 
There might still be difficult cases – did the transaction become 
known at 12:00:09 or 12:00:11 – but the formal tacit 
coordination game to approve a particular block should be able 
to resolve such rare cases. Sometimes, the resolution might 
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need to be so fast that the result would determined by automated 
betting algorithms, but prospective players of the tacit 
coordination games could write bots to invest on their behalf. 
The nature of the tacit coordination game would produce strong 
incentives for such bots to converge. If the principles to which 
they converged came to be seen as problematic, any bad results 
could be revisited by humans revising the relevant conventions 
in writing. 
This highlights the central virtues of a self-governing 
cryptocurrency: It can use judgment, and it can adapt. Not every 
contingency needs to be worked out in advance, because 
judgment can be applied to individual cases and issues, as well 
as to broader issues. As long as the underlying proof-of-belief 
system is foolproof, many other imperfections can exist for a 
time in the software, because those imperfections can be 
addressed both on a case-by-case basis and with new policies. 
With Autonocoin, one could imagine even cancelling 
individual transactions if they were proven to represent theft of 
Autonocoins. Perhaps this is advisable, or perhaps the danger 
of manipulation is too great, but at least with Autonocoin, such 
a reversal is conceivable, and the case for allowing reversals 
can be considered on the merits as a general matter and in 
specific cases if the community consensus is to allow such 
consideration. 
It is quite possible in the end that the evolution of the 
cryptocurrency might lead it in some ways to be similar to 
existing cryptocurrencies. For example, Autonocoin could well 
develop a convention similar to that of XRP for determining 
whether a block is valid. XRP is a cryptocurrency that is part of 
the broader Ripple project, which is designed to provide means 
for easy exchange of currencies, especially fiat currencies.  The 
decentralized nodes that maintain the XRP ledger, known as 
validation nodes, come to consensus about the set of 
transactions to be included in a new block to be approved every 
few seconds. They do this through a voting protocol in which 
each node drops transactions that do not maintain support of 
50% of the nodes trusted by that node (including itself). A node 
will support any transaction that it knows about that is not 
included on or inconsistent with the ledger, but it will stop 
supporting a transaction if the 50% threshold is not met. This 
threshold is gradually raised to 60% and then still higher levels 
so that any transactions that may be close calls are eliminated. 
These transactions will generally be those that were very close 
to the end of the time window for that block, and they will then 
be added to the next block. This system leads to consistent 
development of consensus. 
The key to XRP is the trust mechanism. This is decentralized, 
and there is no protocol determining which nodes a node should 
trust (though some recommended nodes are referenced by the 
official version of the client software).  Recall that the only way 
to manipulate a ledger is to keep valid transactions off the 
ledger. Any single server that attempted to keep one or more 
transactions off the ledger would fail, because 50% or more of 
servers would still approve the transaction. An attacker would 
thus need to create many servers and allow them to become 
trusted over time before using them to keep transactions off the 
ledger. Even that, XRP advocates argue, would ultimately fail, 
because leaving broadcast transactions off the ledger for more 
than one period is a transparent form of manipulation that other 
clients would recognize.  Those clients thus would stop trusting 
the manipulative clients, and the non-manipulative clients 
would thus agree eventually to add the transactions that had 
been omitted.  
It would be straightforward to use the XRP mechanism or a 
variant as the convention for determining whether to add a 
block to the Autonocoin block chain. Combining this 
convention with the convention described above for 
determining the authoritative block chain, there would be no 
need for XRP nodes to choose which other nodes to trust, which 
some might see as being comparable to the designation of one 
or more servers as authoritative and thus undermining the peer-
to-peer nature of the project. XRP nodes must know whom to 
trust because they identify the correct block chain by starting 
with a known trusted block chain and then identifying each 
authentic block as it is processed.  
An Autonocoin software node could simply initialize by 
checking all ledgers available online (most, of course, would 
have the same hash and thus require no comparison), rather than 
by starting with a particular location or locations. Before 
participating itself in transaction approval, it must decide which 
other nodes to trust by monitoring nodes and eliminating any 
that had failed to include any transactions that were broadcast 
sufficiently early that they clearly should have been included. 
When it participated, it would count votes only from 
trustworthy nodes in determining whether to drop particular 
transactions, with longer periods of trustworthiness required for 
higher approval thresholds. 
XRP defenders might argue that there is no need for 
authoritative ledger identification given a sufficiently good 
mechanism for identifying the newest block to be added to the 
block chain.  Indeed, XRP has proven to be stable so far. But a 
mechanism for identifying the authoritative ledger may be 
useful for reasons other than reducing reliance on specifically 
designated servers. It provides some degree of insurance in case 
a fork does occur, whether as a result of attempted manipulation 
or as a result of a natural disaster that prevents synchronization 
of various groups of clients. Normative judgment should not 
commonly be needed to resolve discrepancies, but it is useful 
for a cryptocurrency to include a means of relying on such 
judgment without requiring tacit coordination on some new 
version of the client software. Moreover, such a mechanism 
eliminates the danger that the system could be attacked by a 
simultaneous cyberattack shutting down many of the servers, 
allowing a small percentage of servers to assume control.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The most significant benefit, however, of building a 
cryptocurrency from the bottom-up with a system based on 
normative judgment is that it would highlight the 
cryptocurrency’s ability to rely on such judgment, which then 
could be used for other purposes, such as providing rewards to 
those who act to benefit the cryptocurrency. XRP has been 
criticized because its currency was allocated to the founders of 
Ripple and their friends and associates.  Economists might 
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prefer this to the Bitcoin approach, because it avoids wasteful 
rent-seeking, or at least it channels the rent-seeking to the stage 
of creating useful new cryptocurrencies. But Bitcoin may have 
ideological appeal precisely because of the absence of an entity 
getting rich through an IPO. 
Self-governance enables a funding mechanism for 
Autonocoin that is different from the funding mechanisms for 
other cryptocurrencies. Existing cryptocurrencies issue 
currency in one or both of the ways exemplified by XRP and 
Bitcoin. First, the cryptocurrency founders may issue 
themselves or others (who may or may not have supported the 
initial development of the cryptocurrency) cryptocurrency 
units. This can lead to perceptions of unfairness. Second, 
cryptocurrency units can be issued to individuals engaged in 
mining or similar activities that serve to protect the integrity of 
the block chain and reduce the danger of double-spend 
transactions. This can lead to concerns, particularly for proof-
of-work cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, that the 
cryptocurrency is encouraging wasteful activity. Issuance of 
any cryptocurrency after the cryptocurrency is initially created, 
meanwhile, necessarily dilutes the value of existing 
cryptocurrency holdings.  
 The result is that those who contribute to the success of a 
cryptocurrency do not necessarily share proportionately to their 
contributions. Founders of a cryptocurrency will have 
incentives to create a strong product, because they intend to 
issue cryptocurrency to themselves. But this does not produce 
strong incentives for them and others to improve the 
cryptocurrency or to engage in activities such as marketing and 
regulatory compliance. Such incentives exist only so long as the 
founding entity holds cryptocurrency, and so the incentives will 
decline as their stock of cryptocurrency declines. Meanwhile, 
founders may issue to themselves what others perceive as too 
much cryptocurrency. 
 Autonocoin can solve this problem, because the 
cryptocurrency community can decide whether to issue 
rewards, and in what amounts, to individuals or firms who have 
made particular contributions to the cryptocurrency. For 
example, an early adopter merchant might apply for a reward; 
presumably, earlier adopters would receive larger rewards than 
later adopters, and larger early adopters would receive larger 
rewards than smaller early adopters. Someone who develops an 
improvement to Autonocoin (or comes up with the idea of 
Autonocoin in the first place!) would likely be entitled to a 
reward. The cryptocurrency community would determine, by 
investments on the block chain, how high the reward for each 
of these should be.  
 This still leaves one question, that of who receives the initial 
award of Autonocoin. One possibility is to give the initial coins 
to some initial developers. This might be based on an agreement 
among them as to their initial contributions. Or the amount 
might be given to them as reward for a portion of their 
contributions, and the remainder of their contributions might be 
rewarded through Autonocoin itself. Subsequent rewards to 
others would then be proportional to the perceived value of 
those later rewards. 
 Another possibility is for the initial distribution of the 
currency to be distributed through an airdrop. The Aurora 
cryptocurrency was designed in this way, taking advantage of 
unique identification numbers in Iceland to stake the entire 
country in the cryptocurrency. This approach led to great 
interest in the cryptocurrency, which ended up failing for other 
technical reasons. A similar approach for Autonocoin might be 
to allow anyone with a mobile number to claim 1 Autonocoin. 
Some who signed up might be included in the genesis 
transaction. Anyone afterward could then operate a service that 
would certify public keys as belonging to particular mobile 
numbers, and the Autonocoin community could then confirm or 
deny individual applications for 1 Autonocoin with a formal 
tacit coordination game, based presumably on the reputation of 
the certifier. This approach would provide an egalitarian 
approach for initial distribution of Autonocoins, while still 
allowing rewards for those who did work before and after. 
Other cryptocurrencies, lacking a mechanism for making 
judgments about mobile numbers and certifiers, might not be 
able to perform an airdrop as easily. 
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